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A  brief  review  of  the  aging  of  the  Mexican  population,  the  high  labor  force 
participation of elderly, and the lack of retirement pensions, is followed by a 
causal  empirical  analysis  using  a  panel  data  set  (Mexican  Health  and  Aging 
Study,  MHAS)  of  Mexicans  aged  50  and  more.  We  find  that  the  labor  force 
participation of elderly men is affected by their economic situation; in particular 
the availability of a retirement pension (after contributions to a pension plan 
earlier  in  their  life)  reduces  participation.  A  better  health  raises  male 
participation rates, while the health effect is absent for women. The opposite 
effect,  from  labor  force  participation  on  health  status,  is  negligible  for  both 
genders. Access to health services, which is obtained if the partner or a child is 
working,  reduces  participation  rates.  Additional  analysis  indicates  that  the 
same  variables  influence  the  choice  for  a  job  in  the  formal  or  the  informal 
sector, and whether a job is held in addition to a pension. The results suggest 
that a redesign of the social security including retirement pensions and health 
care  services  has  implications  for  the  individuals’  participation  decisions,  and 
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1. Introduction 
 
For the long-run economic development in Mexico it is important to be aware of and account 
for the economic consequences of foreseeable demographic changes in discussions about the 
redesign of the social security system. As is well-documented, Mexico has, similar to many 
other  OECD  countries,  an  aging  population  (Burniaux  et  al.,  2004;  Wong,  2001;  Zúñiga 
Herrera, 2004). One of the consequences of an aging population is an increased pressure on 
pension plans. On the one hand there are more people who have the right to claim from the 
plan, while on the other hand the number of people who contribute to the plans is likely to 
decrease due to a decreasing labor force. The latter however can be compensated if the low 
participation rates in pension plans would increase. Currently the income situation of elderly 
in Mexico is not very good (e.g. Pedrero Nieto, 1999; Parker and Wong, 2001; Wong and 
Espinoza, 2003; Rodriguez-Flores and DeVaney, 2006), partly due to a lack of access to a 
retirement pension. Another consequence of an aging population is that the costs for health 
care services can be expected to increase, because in general elderly people have more health 
problems. The larger number of elderly is therefore likely to increase the pressure on health 
expenses (e.g. Ham Chande, 1999), which are paid from social security plans that are filled by 
working people and increasingly through tax-financed social protection (Seguro Popular). It 
implies  that  the  younger  generations  (whose  size  will  decrease  in  the  long  run)  have  to 
contribute more to the social security or protection plans in order to cover the health expenses 
for the older generations. This may create additional incentives for informality, avoiding taxes 
and contributions to social security (Levy, 2008). 
Reforms in social security, e.g. those proposed in Aguilera (2010a,b) should on the one 
hand increase both the access to health care services and retirement pensions while on the 
other hand setting incentives such that jobs in the formal sector (that pay contributions to the 
social security system and payroll taxes) remain attractive in comparison to informal sector 
jobs (that do not pay for the social security system). A careful redesign may reinforce itself 
due to potentially beneficiary relation between labor force participation and health; a better 
health care affects not only public health but also may help people to remain more productive 
for a longer time. 
Labor force participation, retirement issues and health are closely related. However, 
not a lot is known about the mechanisms that govern labor force participation, retirement 
decisions,  and  health.  Parker  and  Wong  (2001)  analyze  the  determinants  of  health  care 
coverage and of pension receipt, but explain neither health status nor participation. Aguila 
(2007, 2008) shows that financial considerations are important in the decision to retire or 
continue working. Van Gameren (2008) analyzes the relation between participation and health 
and concludes that better health increases participation, and that there are no clear indications 
of a causality running in the opposite direction. Elderly who contributed to a retirement plan 
are  more  likely  to  withdraw  from  the  labor  market.  Barros  (2008)  concludes  that  the 
introduction of Seguro Popular has positive but small effects on health status, and does not 
affect the labor decisions.  
In this chapter we document population aging and labor force participation in Mexico, 
and  in  particular  we  analyze  the  relation  between  health,  labor  force  participation  and 
retirement. The next section presents numbers on the population distribution, from which it is 
clear that also in Mexico aging is a relevant phenomenon. Labor force participation statistics 
show that Mexico’s labor market is atypical in the OECD, with high participation rates among 
the elderly, and a large informal sector. Data for the descriptive analysis is borrowed from page 3/29 
various sources. The empirical analysis is based on the Mexican Health and Aging Study 
(MHAS; in Spanish: Estudio Nacional sobre Salud y Envejecimiento en México, ENASEM), 
introduced in section 3, a panel data set that contains detailed information on the health and 
financial  situation  of  the  elderly.  It  allows  us  to  link,  in  section  4,  the  participation  of 
individual elderly with their economic and social circumstances and health. We present and 
discuss  estimations  of  the  causality  between  labor  force  participation  and  health,  and  an 
analysis of the joint choice of sector (formal, informal) and receipt of benefits. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Stylized facts: Elderly at Work 
 
2.1 Aging  
 
Similar  to  other  OECD  countries,  Mexico  has  an  aging  population.  In  many  European 
countries the process has already advanced to increases of the share of the oldest cohorts, 
while in Mexico aging is still in its early stages, reflected by a major decline in the size of the 
youngest age cohorts (Burniaux et al., 2004; Wong, 2001; Zúñiga Herrera, 2004), similar to 
Latin-American  countries  as  Brazil  and  Colombia  (CEPAL,  2008).  Despite  the  relatively 
young population at this moment, the decline of the  youngest cohorts implies that in the 
medium and long run the proportion of older people will increase drastically.  
Figure 1 shows the population distribution over the age groups for several OECD-
countries, where the third panel shows the share of people aged 65 or more. Notice that in all 
other countries the share of elderly people steadily grew between 1970 and 2006, to 19.7% in 
Germany and around 15% for several other countries. In Mexico the share of people aged over 
65 is well below the shares of this age group in the other countries, and rather stable around 
5% of the total population. This stability however is not likely to continue forever, because the 
other two panels show that Mexico is converging to the other countries. Especially the share of 
children younger than 15 strongly decreased, and now is at about 30%, the point where the 
other countries were in 1970. Also in the other countries the share of young people decreased 
since 1970, but at a lower rate than in Mexico. The reduced birth rates are already reflected in 
the share of people aged 15-64. While in other countries this group’s share increased only 
marginally,  in  Mexico  the  share  grew  from  48%  to  64%  and  caught  up  with  the  other 
countries. It is to be expected that these trends continue, and that Mexico’s elderly population 
will start to grow similar to what has happened in other countries. 
Projections of the elderly population in Mexico are shown in figure 2, drawn from 
Zúñiga Herrera (2004). The number of elderly aged 60 or more is expected to grow from 
about 8 million in 2000 to more than 36 million in 2050, with highest growth rates before 
2020. The share of elderly aged over 60 will grow from about 7.3% of the total population in 
2000 to 17.5% in 2030 and 28% in 2050 (Zúñiga Herrera, 2004).  
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Figure 2 Population aged 60 or older, 2000-2050 
 
Source: CONAPO, Zúñiga Herrera (2004,Gráfica 4)  
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2.2 Labor force participation 
 
In figure 3 we compare the labor force participation of elderly in Mexico with the participation 
rates in the same set of countries as used in figure 1. Participation in Mexico is higher for all 
groups  except  women  aged  55-64.  In  that  group  the  participation  rate  in  Mexico  is  not 
different from other countries, but for the men in the same age group the participation in 
Mexico is much larger compared to the other countries. The difference becomes even more 
striking when we look at men aged over 65. In Mexico more than 50% is still active in the 
labor market, while in the USA this is only 18% and in none of the remaining countries the 
fraction of working men over 65 reaches 10%. Strikingly, participation of male elderly is 
about double the size of participation in countries as Argentina, Brazil and Colombia (CISS, 
2006;  CEPAL,  2008).  Participation  among  women  over  65  is  much  lower  than  male 
participation, also in Mexico, but unlike for younger women, Mexico has the highest share of 
elder women working.  
 
2.3 Social security contributions 
 
An  important  feature  of  the  labor  market  in  Mexico  is  the  size  of  the  informal  sector. 
Estimates of the total size of the informal economy are by its nature difficult to make, due to 
issues about the definition of informality and difficulties to measure unregistered activities. A 
definition that is relevant for the labor market in Mexico is the distinction between jobs that 
give access to social security services and jobs that do not provide access. The latter are 
generally considered as informal sector jobs, while jobs with employers who pay the legally 
required contributions to social security plans are considered formal sector jobs.  page 6/29 
Informality is often associated with segmentation of the labor market, interpreting the 
choice for an informal job as a ‘negative’ choice caused by a lack of opportunities to obtain 
jobs in the formal sector (Fields, 1990). Research for Mexico suggests that the choice for the 
informal sector is not due to segmentation but has a voluntary component where at a certain 
moment the benefits obtained when accepting a formal job do not outweigh disadvantages 
(Maloney, 1999, 2004; Gong and Van Soest, 2002; Navarro-Lozano and Schrimpf, 2004; 
Levy, 2008). Maloney (2004) estimates that during the 1990s about 55-60% of the labor force 
held  an  informal  job,  while  Levy  (2008)  reports  that  58%  of  the  economically  active 
population in 2006 is working in the informal sector. 
Social security in Mexico is organized through institutes that offer a bundled set of 
benefits for their affiliates, including health insurance, disability, work-risk and life insurance, 
housing loans, day care services for children, and retirement pensions. The largest institute, the 
Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS), provides social security services for employees 
in the private sector, while the ISSSTE (Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los 
Trabajadores del Estado) serves public sector workers. Smaller institutions provide services 
for Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX, the state oil company), the army, navy, federal states, and 
municipalities. The retirement pensions offered by the social security institutes used to be a 
pay-as-you-go system with defined benefits, where the working people paid for the pensions 
of the retired generations. Retirees received a pension that was a given percentage of their last 
salary(ies). The IMSS had a normal retirement age of 65 years, while early retirement (with a 
reduced pension) from age 60 onwards was possible if one had contributed at least 10 years. A 
major change to their pensions was implemented in 1997, when the prevailing system was 
replaced by a system of personal retirement accounts with defined contributions. Instead of 
paying  for  the  elderly  of  that  moment,  working  people’s  contributions  where  added  to 
individual savings accounts, together with a government subsidy that guarantees a minimum 
pension for all participants. The savings in those accounts
1 are used to pay a pension after 
retirement, of which the level depends on the accrued savings. The normal retirement age and 
the earliest retirement age (65 and 60 years, respectively) have not changed, but the minimum 
number of years with contributions increased to 25 years.
2 People who contributed under both 
regimes, that is, before and after 1997, can, at the moment of retirement, choose to retire under 
the regime that gives them the highest pension. A difference between the pension plans of 
ISSSTE and IMSS was that the minimum retirement age was practically absent for public 
sector workers. The reform of the ISSSTE pensions from a pay-as-you-go system to individual 
accounts is implemented only in 2007, to a system that is largely identical to the new IMSS 
system (except that the choice between the old and the new regime has to be made directly).  
The first column in table 1 shows the number of people who have access to social 
security services. Only about 44% of the total population was covered by social security in 
2004. This number does not tell us how many people save for a retirement pension, because 
the coverage of social security, in particular its health insurance, is individually available for 
the partner, children and parents of the holder of a formal job, while a retirement pension is 
available only for the insured worker (or, in case of death, for the partner) and not for the other 
individuals covered through the job holder. Therefore, for the coverage of retirement pension 
schemes, we have to look at the second column of table 1, where only the economically active 
                                                 
1 Managed by privately arranged AFOREs (Administradora de Fondos de Ahorro para el Retiro) 
2 Retirement before age 60 is possible under the new system if the worker has saved enough to obtain a pension of at least 
130% of the minimum pension guarantee. page 7/29 
population is considered. More than 60% of them do not have social security through the own 
job; only about 15 million people are covered. This is not exactly the same as participation in a 
pension scheme, but gives a good indication (similar to the estimates of García Nieto et al. 
(2005)). However it is likely that a sizeable number of those who currently contribute to a 
pension plan cannot expect to receive the minimum pension once they reach the retirement 
age because they do not fulfill the rules of the minimum number of years of contribution. 
The last two columns of table 1 show the number of pensions paid in 2000 and 2004. 
The total number of pension beneficiaries grew from about 2 million in 2000 to 3 million in 
2004, an annual growth rate of 9.6%. These numbers include pensions due to disabilities and 
widows, but a large part of the pensions are paid as a retirement pension, as is confirmed by 
the numbers for IMSS shown in table 2. Clearly the number of retirement pensions (both 
unemployment or early retirement, and full retirement pensions) is growing rapidly, and given 
the expected growth in the number of elderly people (figure 2) it is likely that the number of 
claimants of an old-age pension will continue to grow rapidly (Partida Bush, 2004). 
 
Table 1 Population with social security (2004) and granted pensions (2000, 2004), by social security institute (thousands of persons) 
  Population  Employee, 
insurance holder 
Population with a pension 
(2000)  (2004) 
Total population  104 320       
Economically Active Population  --  43 859     
Population with social security  45 873  15 249  2 075  2 997 
IMSS  34 153  11 941  1 533  2 112 
ISSSTE  7 478  2 625  303  533 
Other 
a  3 147  251  137  223 
Private institutes  1 094  432  102  130 
a Includes PEMEX (state oil company), Army, Navy, and people insured via the National Health Ministry (Seguro Popular). 
Source: INEGI, IMSS. Encuesta Nacional de Empleo y Seguridad Social (Cuadros 2.1 y 4.6). 
 
Table 2 Pensions granted by the IMSS, by type of pension and insurance class, 1997-2006 
  Direct pensions    Pensions for surviving relatives 






  Widow(er)  Orphans  Other 
dependents  
1997  302 201  371 676  192 954  189 982    421 940  140 582  33 807 
1999  301 652  451 662  203 735  197 113    446 060  112 685  33 215 
2001  280 011  545 139  220 810  208 962    476 164  91 455  32 596 
2002  277 637  594 306  229 702  215 729    494 603  87 897  33 375 
2003  279 848  636 861  237 769  220 814    513 220  83 708  34 754 
2004  277 318  691 860  244 083  224 126    537 455  85 551  36 281 
2005  275 144  741 108  251 394  227 591    559 203  84 529  37 485 
2006  325 642  788 232  263 109  269 105    598 343  91 620  44 374 
a Pensions paid directly to the insured person 
b For the pensions for widows, orphans, and other economically dependent relatives, the number refers to the number of pensions granted to 
survivors of people who were insured for Disability and life, and Work hazards 
Source: IMSS. Memoria Estadística (varios años). (http://200.23.8.5/est/contenidos/espanol/rutinas/ept.asp?t=msoc09&s=est&c=1887)  
 
3. Relation between participation, retirement and health: data and descriptive statistics  
 
Research focused at the retirement decision in Mexico is scarce, but in international research 
financial  incentives  allowing  (early)  retirement  are  generally  found  to  be  important 
determinants  of  the  decision  to  stop  working  (Lumsdaine  and  Mitchell,  1999).  A  recent 
contribution for Mexico is Aguila (2008), who concludes that the social security reform of 
1997 increased consumption while crowding out savings for low and lower-middle income 
earners, an effect that is stronger for people close to retirement age. Aguila (2007) concludes 
that also in Mexico the financial incentives are a major determinant of retirement. In general 
the pensions in Mexico are less generous than in European countries, and the consequential 
lack of financial resources can be expected to be an important explanatory factor for the high page 8/29 
labor force participation among elderly that was shown in the previous section. Other factors 
such as health status may however pose restrictions on the employability of the elderly. The 
role of health in labor force participation and retirement decisions, and more general the link 
between health and socio-economic status, is not well understood (Smith, 1999; Adams et al., 
2003). More insight is important to be able to infer the impact of policies that aim to stimulate 
labor force participation and improve the health of the population.  
In this section we introduce the data that is used in the econometric analysis of 
section 4. Here we give descriptive statistics of labor force participation, health, access to 
social security and retirement pensions in a sample of elderly Mexicans.  
 
3.1 Data: Mexican Health and Aging Study 
 
The data used in this chapter are from the Mexican Health and Aging Study (MHAS; Puig et 
al., 2006; Wong et al., 2007). MHAS is organized as a panel survey, where the baseline survey 
(held in 2001) is constructed as a nationally representative sample of the about 13 million 
Mexicans aged 50 and over. The questionnaire contains questions about socio-demographic 
status  (including  information  on  children  living  outside  the  household),  health  status, 
functional limitations, use of health services and other sources of support, current and previous 
labor status, sources of income and properties. Information on the health status consists of a 
self-evaluated, subjective, health assessment of the respondent’s general health. In addition 
there is more objective information collected via a large set of questions regarding whether a 
doctor or other medical personnel has ever told the respondent that he or she suffered from 
specific health problems such as of hypertension, diabetes, cancer, respiratory problems, heart 
problems, stroke, arthritis, and many other diseases and symptoms. 
Both the heads of the selected households as well as their partners were interviewed, 
resulting in a total sample size in 2001 of 15,186 individuals. In the follow-up survey of 2003, 
attempts where made to interview the same age-eligible persons and their household members, 
even if the household had moved or split. Some could not be traced or refused to participate 
(5.8% of the targeted households) while others died in the two years between the interview 
and a next-of-kin was interviewed (3.8% of the interviewed individuals) (Wong and Espinosa, 
2004).  
In the analysis we focus on the households that did not face a change in composition 
due to divorce or death. Such major changes in household composition are likely to dominate 
other decisions. Dropping observations with incomplete information on essential variables (in 
particular, employment and health
3) leaves us with 10,106 individuals with information both 
in 2001 and 2003. Table 3 shows that more than half of the sample, 56.1%, is female. In 2001, 
65.6% of the sampled elderly were younger than 65 years, a percentage that dropped to 58.9% 
in 2003. These percentages hardly differ between men and women. 
 
                                                 
3 Incomplete information on detailed health characteristics is recoded as the absence of the problem at hand. Observations 
where the detailed health information is completely missing in one or both years are excluded from the analysis. page 9/29 
Table 3 Number of observations, by gender and age, 2001 and 2003 
gender  age (2001)  age (2003)  total  %  50-64  65 or more  50-64  65 or more 
men  2 816  1 620  2 530  1 906  4 436  43.9 
women  3 817  1 853  3 425  2 245  5 670  56.1 
total  6 633  3 473  5 955  4 151  10 106  100 
%  65.6  34.4  58.9  41.1  100   
 
3.2 Work and health in 2001 
 
Before we come to a more detailed analysis we have a look at some descriptive statistics of the 
relevant variables. The left panel of table 4 shows the labor force participation of men and 
women by age. Participation is much larger for men than for women, in every age group, 
and  decreases  with  age.  As  we  noted  in  section  2,  these  participation  rates,  which  are 
similar to the numbers reported in Pedrero Nieto (1999), are much higher than in other 
OECD-countries, where hardly anyone aged over 65 reports to be working (OECD, 2007) 
and also higher than in most of the larger South-American countries (CISS, 2006). The 
second panel of table 4 gives the size of the informal sector among the employed people. In 
every age group the number of people working in an informal job (defined as a job that 
does not provide access to health services) is larger than the number with a formal job, 
which  is  in  line  with  the  numbers  mentioned  in  section  2.  On  average,  71.9%  of  the 
working elderly have an informal job. The older the people are, the larger is the share 
working in the informal sector. In all groups, women are more often found in an informal 
job – but keep in mind that overall participation among women is much lower than among 
men. The number of elderly women with a formal job is thus extremely low. 
Panel  3  of  table  4  lists  the  percentage  of  people  who  obtain  income  from  a 
retirement pension. Overall, 12% of the elderly receive a retirement pension, a percentage 
that  matches  with  the  numbers  presented  before.
4  As  we  expected  there  is  a  positive 
relation with age, with a large increase in beneficiaries especially between 60 and 65 years 
of age. Still, even among the oldest elderly, less than 30% of the men receive a retirement 
pension, and among women the percentage with a pension is less than 10%. Further, receipt 
of a pension does not imply that the receiver does not work anymore, as the rightmost panel 
of the table shows. Especially among the younger elderly with a pension, a large fraction is 
still at work, mainly in an informal job (not in table).  
 
Table 4 Labor force participation, per sector, and retirement pensions, by age and gender, 2001 (%) 
  participation  informal sector
a  retirement pension  working
b 
  gender  gender    gender  gender 
age  men women total men women total  men women total men women total
50-54  89.0 34.8 57.7  57.2 68.7 61.2  3.8 5.8 4.9  45.2 26.1 32.3
55-59  81.4 29.1 51.8  65.5 74.5 68.3  6.4 9.6 8.2  44.3 12.5 23.2
60-64  68.1 22.3 41.4  75.8 81.5 77.6  19.2 13.4 15.8  37.1 17.3 27.3
65-69  59.0 16.4 36.2  81.4 88.4 83.1  25.0 11.5 17.8  35.0 8.2 25.7
70-74  52.4 11.9 30.8  89.7 93.7 90.5  25.0 12.6 18.4  35.3 10.4 26.2
75-79  39.6 10.6 24.4  88.5 97.2 90.5  30.2 7.1 18.1  24.7 4.2 20.5
80-…  26.8 7.7 16.5   100.0 100.0  100.0  29.7 9.3 18.7  12.9 8.7 11.8
total  69.3 24.1 44.0  69.9 76.5 71.9  15.3 9.6 12.1  33.5 14.5 25.0
a Share of the informal sector among the employed people 
b Share of working people among the people with a retirement pension 
 
Table 5 shows that the self-assessed health, measured on a five-point scale running from poor 
(0), fair (1), good (2), very good (3) to excellent (4), decreases with age: on average the older 
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people report a worse health. Noteworthy is the difference among men and women: in every 
age category (except the oldest group) women report worse health than men.
5 Displaying the 
same information for the objective health is less straightforward due to the large variety of 
health-related  characteristics.  In  table  6  we  break  down  the  information  for  a  subset  of 
characteristics by age (under and over 65 years) and gender. For most diseases we see that 
prevalence is higher in the older age category, while especially in the group aged less than 65 
years we see an almost systematically higher prevalence among women.  
 
Table 5 Self-assessed health by age and gender, 2001 
           gender   
Age  men  women  total 
50-54  1.602  1.320  1.439 
55-59  1.445  1.214  1.314 
60-64  1.365  1.174  1.253 
65-69  1.290  1.113  1.195 
70-74  1.213  1.019  1.110 
75-79  1.172  0.976  1.069 
80 or more  1.100  1.118  1.110 
total  1.389  1.185  1.275 
 
Table 6 Objective health by age and gender, 2001 
          under 65        over 65 
disease  men  women  men  women 
hypertens./high blood pressure   0.267  0.440  0.340  0.498 
diabetes/high blood sugar  0.131  0.172  0.143  0.185 
cancer/malignant tumor  0.006  0.029  0.013  0.022 
respiratory ill.(asthma)  0.045  0.063  0.080  0.073 
heart attack  0.032  0.021  0.050  0.040 
stroke  0.016  0.020  0.041  0.028 
arthritis/rheumatism  0.127  0.226  0.202  0.316 
liver/kidney infection  0.088  0.127  0.075  0.101 
tuberculosis   0.002  0.004  0.004  0.003 
pneumonia   0.010  0.016  0.019  0.021 
fallen down   0.251  0.401  0.317  0.510 
mental health problems  2.675  3.834  3.341  4.335 
problems with (i)adl  2.160  3.451  4.060  5.675 
 
Table 7 and 8 show the labor force participation and access to health services by age and 
health status. In table 7 we find a positive relation between participation and health for 
every  age  group:  those  who  report  better  health  are  more  often  found  to  be  working. 
Overall, 31.1% of the people in poor health are working, a percentage that raises to 61.3% 
of those who report very good or excellent health. Not shown in the table is that the same 
pattern is found for men and women, obviously  at a much lower level of participation 
among women. Table 8 shows that the people with a better health have more access to 
health services, including  access related to being  employed in  a formal job and  access 
based on a formal job of the partner or children or due to a retirement pension. While 
71.6% of the elderly in very good/excellent health have access to medical services provided 
by the social security institutions, only 55.9% of those in poor health have access.
6 The 
better access for the people who report a better health is found in all age groups, where the 
difference in access between people with poor health and (very) good health is largest for 
the youngest and the oldest elderly. Not shown in the table is that the access to health 
                                                 
5 In following tables and empirical analysis, the categories ‘very good’ and ‘excellent’ self-assessed health are taken 
together, given their small sizes. 
6 Note that these numbers date from the period before the introduction of Seguro Popular, with very limited availability of 
affordable services outside the institutions of the social security.  page 11/29 
services among women is slightly higher than among men. Obviously, for most women this 
access is not due to their own job, as we observed very low participation rates among 
women. 
 
Table 7 Participation by age and health, 2001 (%) 
  self-assessed health   
age  poor  fair  good  very good  total 
50-54  46.0  51.5  65.6  73.6  57.7 
55-59  39.5  47.2  61.4  66.7  51.8 
60-64  28.8  39.3  48.9  57.1  41.4 
65-69  31.4  33.0  43.1  49.3  36.2 
70-74  20.4  32.1  36.4  40.6  30.8 
75-79  18.8  19.3  38.2  38.5  24.4 
80 or more  16.7  15.7  16.5  22.7  16.5 
total  31.1  40.2  53.4  61.3  44.0 
 
Table 8 Access to health services by age and health, 2001 (%) 
  self-assessed health   
age  poor  fair  good  very good  total 
50-54  53.2  60.5  65.4  72.2  62.4 
55-59  54.9  60.5  65.4  70.4  61.8 
60-64  60.1  64.4  65.1  66.7  64.1 
65-69  60.9  67.0  66.9  75.3  66.3 
70-74  57.8  65.2  69.3  71.9  64.8 
75-79  50.9  66.6  62.5  69.2  61.7 
80 or more  45.4  55.1  58.7  81.8  54.9 
total  55.9  62.7  65.5  71.6  63.0 
Note: Access to social security includes rights due to one’s own job or a retirement pension, but also ‘secondary rights’ obtained via a 
formal job of the partner or children. 
 
3.3 Changes between 2001 and 2003 
 
Table 9 shows the labor force participation in 2003 versus the participation in 2001. We 
notice that there is a great persistence; more than 85% of those who were not working in 
2001 also were inactive in 2003 while 77% of those who were employed remained active in 
the  labor  market.  23%  stopped  working,  while  15%  started  to  work  after  having  been 
inactive. Changes in self-assessed health are shown in table 10, separately for elderly who 
were working in 2001 (left panel) and for non-working elderly (right panel). For health we 
see a smaller persistence than for participation; although the numbers on the main diagonals 
are large, there is some tendency towards a fair health, both from poor and good health, 
while a majority of those who reported very good or excellent health in 2001 report a good 
health in 2003.  
 
Table 9 Transitions in participation between 2001 and 2003 (%) 
working in 
2001 
          working in 2003   
no  yes  total 
No  85.6  14.4  100 
yes  23.4  76.6  100 
total  58.2  41.8  100 
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Table 10 Health transitions between 2001 and 2003, by participation (%) 
self-assessed 
health, 2001 
employed in 2001    not employed in 2001 
self-assessed health, 2003      self-assessed health, 2003   
poor  fair  good  very good  total    poor  fair  good  very good  total 
poor  39.8  44.2  13.8  2.2  100    48.9  41.6  9.0  0.5  100 
fair  15.1  60.2  22.1  2.6  100    19.0  60.7  18.3  1.9  100 
good  6.3  40.1  46.6  6.9  100    8.5  43.5  40.9  7.1  100 
very good  4.5  23.7  52.2  19.6  100    3.5  28.3  50.9  17.3  100 
total  13.8  48.1  32.6  5.5  100    21.7  51.3  23.5  3.6  100 
 
4. Relations between participation, retirement and health: causal models 
 
The  tables  in  the  previous  section  suggest  that  there  is  a  relation  between  labor  force 
participation, the receipt of a retirement pension, and the health status. However that does 
not  say  anything  about  causality.  In  this  section  we  analyze  causal  relations  between 
changes  in  labor  force  participation  and  in  health  status.  Section  4.1  briefly  reviews 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, and describes the analytical model. Estimates 
for Mexican elderly are presented and discussed in section 4.2. Section 4.3 digs deeper into 
the effect of labor force participation on health, and section 4.4 analyzes the participation 
decision acknowledging that receipt of a pension does not necessarily imply withdrawal 
from the labor force.  
 
4.1 Theory and empirical evidence 
 
Theoretical retirement models identify various reasons why health status is a determinant of 
the  optimal  retirement  age  (Lumsdaine  and  Mitchell,  1999).  Most  arguments  suggest  a 
relation  where  poor  health  reduces  the  optimal retirement  age  and  thus  the  labor  force 
participation.  First,  poor  health  reduces  the  productivity  of  a  worker  and  therefore  the 
expected  earnings,  implying  that  work  becomes  less  attractive  in  comparison  with 
retirement. Second, job tasks are more demanding when health is weaker, changing the 
preferences in favor of leisure. Third, more time may be necessary to care for one’s health, 
further increasing the utility of leisure and reducing participation. Fourth, with poor health 
one may be entitled for disability benefits that facilitate withdrawal from the labor market. 
A fifth effect of poor health is a reduction of life expectancy, which shortens the time 
horizon of the optimization problem. An anticipated negative health shock then results in a 
shorter  work  life  (and  also  in  fewer  retirement  years).  A  counter-effect  that  postpones 
retirement is that the utility of consumption may increase relative to leisure given that the 
costs of treatment may increase necessary expenses. 
Empirical  analysis  of  the  effect  of  health  on  the  retirement  and  labor  force 
participation decisions is hampered by the possibility of causality running in the opposite 
direction. Health is negatively affected by one’s work if, for example, dangerous labor 
circumstances or long working hours result in the deterioration of a worker’s health. A 
positive direct effect is also possible: a job may contribute to one’s satisfaction and well-
being, which may positively affect the (actual or perceived) health. Further, noting that bad 
health is a legitimate reason to refrain from participation, non-participants may justify their 
withdrawal  from  the  labor  market  by  overreporting  health  problems  (known  as  the 
‘justification hypothesis’, see for example Anderson and Burkhauser, 1985). Under this 
hypothesis, part of the (self-evaluated) health status measures a person’s attitude towards 
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Another measurement issue is that it may be difficult to capture all relevant health 
aspects in one measure. The self-assessed health measure can be expected to give a good 
summary of overall health because the respondent will give a general evaluation of his or 
her health, capturing all relevant aspects. However, diseases and other health problems can 
result in a variety of physical and cognitive limitations with different implications for labor 
capacities,  and  in  reporting  the  health  status  the  respondent  not  only  has  work-related 
aspects in mind. On the other hand, detailed reports on the (more objectively observable) 
prevalence  of  diseases  and  symptoms  that  do  not  suffer  from  justification  bias  are 
necessarily  incomplete.
7  There  is  no  obviously  better  alternative  way  to  combine  the 
information generated by the variety of objective health characteristics into one measure, 
and in a bidirectional causal model it is impossible to include all the relevant health aspects 
as  endogenous  variables.  Therefore  the  self-reported  health  status  as  the  best  available 
summary of health is used in the analysis, while accounting for potential endogeneity and 
misreporting  due  to  justification  by  using  the  objective  health  measures  as  identifying 
variables, as we should expect a close relation between the objective measures and the self-
reported health.
8  
The available empirical evidence suggests that poor health negatively affects labor 
force participation and leads to an earlier retirement, but the range of estimates varies widely, 
partly due to the variety of measures applied (Currie and Madrian, 1999). Evidence on a 
relation  running  from  participation  to  health  is  mixed.  Cutler  et  al.  (2000)  showed  that 
economic crises that hit Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s increased the mortality rates by a 
reduction in the incomes, suggesting that in Mexico a relation running from labor market 
status to health exists. Van Gameren (2008) suggests that for Mexicans aged 50 and over 
health negatively affects labor force participation, but that there is no clear evidence of an 
effect in the opposite direction. In that paper however only the survey of 2001 is used, and 
only men and women with a labor history are (jointly) included. 
 
In the empirical analysis we follow the framework set out by Stern (1989) and Cai (2007) 
to analyze the causal effects of health and labor force participation (see Appendix A for 
details). They derive a simultaneous equations model consisting of a participation equation 
(Pit
*) and an equation for the health status (Hit
*),  




1 xP,it + vP,it,  (1) 
      Hit
* = αH
1 Pit
* + βH xH,it + vH,it,   (2) 
                                                 
7 The detailed reports are also answered by the respondent, but the level of specificity and concreteness of the questions 
and concepts leaves much less room for a subjective answer than is the case with the question regarding the general health 
status.  
8 In empirical work several approaches are followed with regard to the potential endogeneity of health in the retirement or 
participation  decision.  Some  studies  tackled  the  endogeneity  of  self-evaluated  health  through  instrumentation  with 
available objective health indicators such as the prevalence of diseases, medicine usage, or functional limitations. Some 
researchers find indications of endogeneity (e.g. Kerkhofs et al., 1999; Disney et al., 2006; Cai and Kalb, 2006; Cai, 
2007), but in other cases there is no or only weak evidence that self-rated health is endogenous (e.g. Stern, 1989; Dwyer 
and  Mitchell,  1999;  Wolff,  2005).  Dwyer  and  Mitchell  (1999) test  for  the  endogeneity  of  objective  measures  using 
parental health and mortality and respondent’s height/weight ratio as instruments, and conclude that there is no problem 
with endogeneity of health. Bénitez-Silva et al. (2004) exploit the availability in their data of both self-rated disability and 
the receipt of disability benefits (indicating officially, objectively approved disability), and conclude that the subjective 
and objective measures are sufficiently close to each other so that the hypothesis that subjective disability is an unbiased 
estimator of the objectively determined disability cannot be rejected. In an analysis of ten European countries Kalwij and 
Vermeulen (2008) find that the self-evaluated health status is endogenous in some but not all countries. They conclude 
that health should be included as a multidimensional factor using both subjective and objective health information, but 
also that the dimensions important in explaining the participation decision differ between countries. page 14/29 
where observed participation Pit equals 1 if Pit
*>0, and zero otherwise, and the parameter λP
1 
measures the (causal) effect of health on the participation decision. Hit
* is the continuous 
counterpart of the observed self-assessed health Hit, measured on a four-point scale. Due to the 
justification hypothesis, the self-assessed health is not necessarily equal to the true health. The 
parameter αH
1 represents the sum of the (causal) effect of labor force participation on the true 
health, which could be negative (e.g. because of bad labor conditions) or positive (e.g. due to 
increased satisfaction), and of the effect of justification. The latter has a positive value, as the 
hypothesis states that participating elderly report a better health status than they have in reality. 
The explanatory variables in the two equations (xP,it, xH,it) may be different.  
The joint estimation of the model given by the two equations is not straightforward, 
due to the qualitative nature of the dependent variables, and therefore we opt for a two-stage 
method.  In  the  first  stage,  reduced  forms  of  both  the  participation  equation  and  health 
equation are estimated, including all available variables. The results from those estimations are 
used to calculate the propensity to participate in the labor market ( it P ˆ ) and the ‘health stock’ 
(Ĥit) of each individual i in each time period t. In the second stage the structural model defined 
by equations (1) and (2) is estimated, where the predictions Ĥit and  it P ˆ  replace the endogenous 
explanatory variables Hit
* and Pit
* (see Appendix A for more details).  
 
What remains is to be discussed is which variables are included in the model; until now we 
have only stated that objective health is used to identify the health equation. Cai (2007), 
using  Australian  panel  data,  includes  marital  status,  children  and  age  to  identify  the 
employment equation, while information on smoking, drinking, physical activities and the 
prevalence  of  a  long-term  health  condition  identify  the  health  equation.  Demography, 
education, job history, occupational and spousal information are included in both equations. 
His preferred instruments in the health equation, the specific and objective health indicators 
such as symptoms, types and severity of disability or health conditions, which are likely to 
be major determinants of the general health, were not available (Cai, 2007).
9 In our data the 
objective indicators of the respondents’ health are available and used to identify the health 
equation. The objective health measures have a strong explanatory effect on the observed 
self-assessed  health  and  are  thus  clearly  related  with  the  endogenous  variable.  Some 
diseases and symptoms however turned out to be invalid as instruments and are excluded 
from the analysis.  
Job and occupational history, and the history of contributions to pension plans are 
used  to  identify  the  job  equation,  instead  of  using  them  in  both  equations.  History  of 
contributions pension plans is summarized by a block of dummy variables that combine 
different ages and numbers of years with deposits at pension plans. The age classes are 
bounded by the early and the normal retirement ages, 60 and 65 years. However retirement 
is generally only possible if for at least 25 years deposits have been made, while with 10 
years with deposits more flexible solutions can be available already. The reference category 
is formed by the elderly who never made deposits. The variables on job and occupational 
history show that the large majority of the male sample had their main job in manufacturing 
or agriculture, while for women the service industry, which includes domestic work, is a 
major sector of employment (Appendix B). Salaried work and self-employment are the 
                                                 
9 Others use health and living circumstances during childhood as instruments, but this information has the drawback that, 
apart from having the (desired) effect on health in later years, it is also likely to have a direct effect on education and via 
that on human capital formation, wages and labor market outcomes (Currie and Madrian, 1999). page 15/29 
most frequently observed contractual arrangements. We find a clear relation between the 
labor force participation and the labor history,  although the relation is weaker than for 
health. Overidentification tests do not reject the null hypothesis that the variables can be 
excluded from the other equation (and thus are valid as instruments).  
Additional explanatory variables in xP,it and xH,it include the general demographic 
situation of the individuals such as age, household composition and the number of children 
(see Appendix B). Older age is frequently found to correlate with health deterioration. The 
highest level of education is generally found to be an important factor both for participation 
and health. More than 50% of our sample has maximum primary education. We create 
more variation through the inclusion of specific capacities (reading and writing, counting, 
use of English or an indigenous language). Other variables included in both equations are 
the  degree  of  urbanization,  the  available  non-business  assets,  and  the  access  to  social 
security services. Apart from their effects on (need for) participation, these variables may 
also have an effect health as poverty indicators, knowing that poor people often have more 
health problems.  
 
4.2 Participation and health: results 
 
Table 11 presents the estimation results of the structural (causal) model outlined above. The 
effect of health on labor force participation is significantly positive only for men; elderly 
men  with  a  better  (perceived)  health  are  more  likely  to  be  employed  than  men  with  a 
weaker health. For elderly women we do not find a significant effect, female labor force 
participation decisions appear not to be related to their health status. The analysis includes 
all sampled people aged over 50, including those who never had a paid job. Especially 
among women a large share never had a paid job, and the participation decision at older age 
is probably governed by choices made much earlier in life regarding the distribution of task 
between man and wife. We see that women who are married or living together are much 
less likely to work, and that the more children they have the less likely it is that they are 
employed. These variables have no contribution at all to the explanation of participation of 
male elderly.  
The effect of previous deposits at pension plans varies greatly between men and 
women, which obviously relates to the differences in labor histories. The older the men 
who made deposits at pension plans are, and the longer the duration of the contributions, 
the lower the probability that they are still in employment. Obviously the older they are and 
the longer they contributed, the more likely it is that they fulfill the requirements to obtain a 
retirement pension and have the financial capacities to stop working. Among women, the 
number of those who never worked –and thus never contributed to any pension plan– is 
much larger than among men. Therefore we find a strong positive effect on participation for 
women who ever made contributions to a pension plan and are younger than 65 years, 
especially if they have contributed between 10 and 25 years. With more years in the labor 
market and with contributions to a pension plan, they can qualify for a (better) retirement 
pension.  
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Table 11 Causal model for participation and health  
  men  women 
  LFP  health  LFP  health 
health (lin.pred.)               0.404  ***  (0.042)        0.055    (0.038)       
labor force part. (lin.pred.)          -0.019    (0.036)        0,012    (0.019) 
age                              -0.070    (0.048)  -0.074  ***  (0.028)  -0.012    (0.037)  -0,066  ***  (0.022) 
age squared                      -0.013    (0.037)  0.047  **  (0.020)  -0.036    (0.029)  0,043  ***  (0.017) 
#children (live births)          0.000    (0.008)  -0.001    (0.006)  -0.028  ***  (0.009)  -0,010  *  (0.006) 
couple   0.030    (0.077)  -0.148  **  (0.059)  -0.433  ***  (0.063)  -0,077  **  (0.038) 
educ.: primary                   -0.093    (0.096)  0.134  **  (0.058)  -0.264  ***  (0.084)  0,052    (0.057) 
educ.: secondary                 -0.263  *  (0.146)  0.310  ***  (0.090)  0.204    (0.140)  0,296  ***  (0.094) 
educ.: technical/commercial      -0.595  ***  (0.211)  0.507  ***  (0.134)  -0.014    (0.138)  0,432  ***  (0.087) 
educ.: preparatory or higher     -0.079    (0.167)  0.667  ***  (0.086)  0.133    (0.187)  0,607  ***  (0.089) 
able to read and write           0.057    (0.113)  -0.108    (0.081)  0.145    (0.116)  -0,046    (0.059) 
able to count from 1 to 10       0.106    (0.131)  -0.023    (0.097)  0.205    (0.129)  -0,002    (0.076) 
speaks English                   -0.139    (0.099)  0.159  ***  (0.061)  -0.003    (0.114)  0,255  ***  (0.070) 
speaks indigenous language       0.008    (0.101)  0.148  *  (0.076)  0.001    (0.117)  0,103    (0.064) 
locality size: 15000-100000      0.100    (0.088)  -0.169  ***  (0.051)  0.119    (0.084)  -0,057    (0.046) 
locality size: 2500-15000        0.232  **  (0.107)  -0.123    (0.079)  0.269  ***  (0.100)  -0,109  *  (0.061) 
locality size: <2500             0.386  ***  (0.102)  -0.184  ***  (0.056)  0.058    (0.092)  -0,212  ***  (0.052) 
assetsNB                         -0.018    (0.038)  0.073  **  (0.036)  -0.045    (0.052)  0,074  *  (0.039) 
has access to social security    -0.186  ***  (0.068)        -0.341  ***  (0.055)       
contributed, age <60, <=10 yrs   -0.018    (0.144)        0.701  ***  (0.153)       
contributed, age <60, 10<=25 yrs   0.115    (0.129)        1.217  ***  (0.168)       
contributed, age <60, >25 yrs   -0.338  ***  (0.127)        1.076  ***  (0.193)       
contributed, age 60-65, <=10 yrs   -0.280    (0.214)        0.572  *  (0.333)       
contributed, age 60-65,10<=25 yrs   -0.531  ***  (0.201)        1.011  ***  (0.292)       
contributed, age 60-65, >25 yrs   -0.657  ***  (0.136)        0.409  *  (0.244)       
contributed, age >=65, <=10 yrs   -0.364  ***  (0.138)        0.369    (0.331)       
contributed, age >=65, 10<=25 yrs   -0.342  **  (0.151)        0.116    (0.337)       
contributed, age >=65, >25 yrs   -0.739  ***  (0.134)        -0.321    (0.282)       
occ.: production, repair, maintenance  1.882  **  (0.852)        1.240  ***  (0.110)       
occ.: agriculture   2.067  **  (0.869)        0.999  ***  (0.148)       
occ.: professional, technical, education  1.961  **  (0.877)        0.952  ***  (0.161)       
occ.: management position   2.180  **  (0.878)        1.647  ***  (0.281)       
occ.: administrative activities   1.747  **  (0.891)        0.804  ***  (0.149)       
occ.: merchants, sales representative  2.340  ***  (0.866)        1.762  ***  (0.117)       
occ.: service industry, domestic work  2.175  **  (0.858)        1.250  ***  (0.093)       
occ.: other   1.607  *  (0.870)        1.259    (3.725)       
contr.: boss                     0.516  ***  (0.176)        1.109  ***  (0.224)       
contr.: self-employed            0.502  ***  (0.073)        0.875  ***  (0.086)       
contr.: commission, other payment   0.040    (0.114)        0.488  ***  (0.115)       
contr.: without payment          0.330    (0.427)        0.133    (0.129)       
contr.: other/unknown            0.239    (0.425)        0.009    (0.484)       
dis.: cancer/malignant tumor           -0.630  *  (0.323)        -0,180    (0.170) 
dis.: respiratory ill.(asthma)         -0.410  ***  (0.093)        -0,152    (0.103) 
dis.: heart attack                     -0.580  ***  (0.132)        -0,438  ***  (0.154) 
dis.: arthritis/rheumatism             -0.241  ***  (0.063)        -0,283  ***  (0.052) 
dis.: liver/kidney infection           -0.245  **  (0.096)        -0,252  ***  (0.074) 
dis.: pneumonia                        -0.232    (0.258)        -0,090    (0.223) 
dis.: fallen down                      -0.089    (0.054)        -0,114  **  (0.049) 
dis.: #mental health problems          -0.129  ***  (0.014)        -0,134  ***  (0.009) 
overweight: 25<=bmi<30                 0.056    (0.057)        0,119  **  (0.054) 
overweight: 30<=bmi                    0.037    (0.067)        -0,026    (0.035) 
sympt: swollen feet/ankles             -0.194  ***  (0.065)        -0,171  ***  (0.056) 
sympt: difficulty breathing            -0.102    (0.081)        -0,119  *  (0.071) 
sympt: fainting spells.vertigo         -0.148  **  (0.070)        -0,220  ***  (0.054) 
sympt: intense thirst                  -0.064    (0.062)        -0,118  *  (0.067) 
sympt: sev.fatigue/exhaustion          -0.247  ***  (0.064)        -0,167  ***  (0.056) 
sympt: wheezing/cough/phlegm           -0.019    (0.058)        -0,072    (0.062) 
sympt: pain in lower limbs             -0.321  ***  (0.061)        -0,251  ***  (0.048) 
sympt: stomach pain. indigest.         -0.122  *  (0.068)        -0,103  **  (0.046) 
sympt: involunt. loss of urine         -0.242  ***  (0.092)        -0,116    (0.081) 
constant                         5.347  ***  (1.768)        0.225    (1.212)       
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cut-off point 1                        -5.103  ***  (1.043)        -4,782  ***  (0.743) 
cut-off point 2                        -3.255  ***  (1.031)        -2,685  ***  (0.733) 
cut-off point 3                        -1.550    (1.022)        -0,951    (0.729) 
rho                              0.610  ***  (0.021)  0.240  ***  (0.012)  0.625  ***  (0.015)  0,272  ***  (0.011) 
#observations                    8872    8872    11340    11340   
Chi2 Test                        1190.4    895.1    1244.8    1477.7   
p-value Chi2                     0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000   
LogLikelihood                    -4248.0    -8952.0    -4616.6    -10681.9   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: Standard errors obtained via bootstrapping (100 draws) 
 
Both  for  men  and  women  the  variable  that  indicates  access  to  social  security 
services, either due to one’s own work or pension or due to working relatives, has a strong 
negative effect on the participation decision.
10 Empirical evidence from the USA suggests 
that individuals who rely on their current employer for health insurance have an incentive 
to remain employed, while individuals with other sources of health insurance have less 
reasons to participate in the labor market (Currie and Madrian, 1999; Gruber and Madrian, 
2002). The negative effect of access due to others (partner, children) on participation is a 
strong  effect  among  Mexican  elderly  because  many  more  elderly  than  in  the  USA  are 
entitled to insurance through their partner or children.  
The general health status is explained by the objective health characteristics, age 
and poverty indicators. Older men and women report to be less healthy, while elderly with 
more education report a better health status. Households who possess more assets are in a 
better health while elderly living in rural areas are less healthy. Neither for men nor women 
we find an effect of labor force participation on the health status.  
 
4.3 Participation and specific health problems 
 
In the analysis above we find strong indications that the general (self-assessed) health status 
affects the male participation decision, but we encounter no evidence of an effect in the 
opposite direction. A complication with the analysis is that we cannot disentangle the direct 
effect of participation on the true health status from the effect due to justification of the labor 
status (see section 4.1 and Appendix A). The two effects may neutralize each other, resulting 
in the estimated absence of an effect of labor on health while in reality an effect of labor on 
(true) health may exist. 
In this section we reconsider the effect of labor force participation on health by looking 
at specific diseases and symptoms instead of the self-reported health status used above. The 
information on the specific diseases and symptoms is derived from survey questions if a 
doctor or other medical specialist had told the client that he or she suffered from the disease. 
This phrasing leaves much less room for interpretation or justification, and therefore we can 
directly estimate an equation with the true prevalence of a disease or symptom, without 
having to account for justification. Each disease and symptom can have a different effect on 
participation,  while  their  prevalence  may  be  correlated,  and  an  unmanageably  large 
                                                 
10 Access to social security is suspect to be endogenous, as the access may be obtained due to one’s own job; however the 
indicator used here includes access obtained due to the partner’s or children’s job, and participation includes formal and 
informal  employment  where  the  latter  does  not  give  access  rights.  The  total  set  of  instruments  passes  the 
overidentification tests, indicating their validity and suggesting no direct effect of access rights on health. The parameter 
estimates, in particular the effects of health and participation, only show minor changes if only access due to working 
relatives is included in the model.  page 18/29 
simultaneous equation system with equations for participation and all diseases would be 
required to take all effects in account.  
An  alternative  strategy  to  avoid  potential  endogeneity  is  to  explain  the  health 
situation in 2003 on the basis of the circumstances in 2001. By definition, all explanatory 
variables are pre-determined, and possibly explain the occurrence of health problem j in the 
two years before the interview of 2003:  
      Si,03
j = αH
 j Pi,01 + ζH
j xi,01 + γH
j SH,i,01 + uH,i,01
j,   (3) 
where we use the observed labor force participation (Pi,01) instead of the latent variable 
Pi,01
*. As explanatory variables we use all the exogenous variables used in the estimations 
in table 11, thus xi,01 includes the detailed job characteristics, and we use the complete 
detailed health situation as reported in 2001, Si,01, including the lagged dependent variable 
Si,01
j, which allows to control for persistence of the health situation. 
 
Table 12 summarizes the main findings of the probit estimates of equation (3) for each of 
the specific diseases and symptoms, separately for men and women. We do not find many 
significant effects of labor force participation in 2001 on the prevalence of diseases and 
symptoms in 2003. The only significant effect that we find for men is a positive effect of 
participation  on  the  probability  to  have  overweight.  For  women  we  find  a  few  more 
significant effects, but except for the incidence of fall accidents, the significant effects have 
a negative effect on the prevalence of disease or symptoms: work seems to protect them 
against hypertension, diabetes, cancer, pneumonia and (i)adl-problems, an effect that is also 
found for several symptoms. However it seems unlikely that the protective effect of labor 
force participation is a true effect. Probably the effect relates to other (unmeasured) factors 
that make that working women are healthier; the small group of working elderly women is 
a  selective  group.  In  all  cases,  for  men  and  women,  the  persistence  of  diseases  and 
symptoms is very high: reporting a problem in 2001 strongly increases the probability that 
the problem also is reported in 2003. Leaving out the persons who already reported the 
specific health problem in 2001 does not alter the conclusion about the role of labor force 
participation on the prevalence of health problems in 2003 for the remaining persons.
11,12  
The  effect  of  labor  on  health  not  necessarily  runs  via  participation  but  may  be 
related to job type. For a limited number of health problems we find that job characteristics 
are significant, suggesting that there are effects of the sector and the type (salaried, self-
employed, etc.) of the main job during the work-life on the development of health after 
2001. In particular there are indications that workers in service sector, professional and 
office workers have less health problems while among women we see that self-employed 
women have more problems.  
Altogether  the  results  suggest  that  there  are  only  small  effects  of  labor  force 
participation in 2001 on the health in the next two years.  
 
Table 12 Effect of participation in 2001 on health in 2003 
   -see at the end of the paper - 
 
                                                 
11 Previous episodes of bad health or accidents may have affected both participation and health status in 2001. Given the 
persistence we have to observe people over a longer period to be able to determine causal effects more precisely.  
12 A similar analysis explaining employment in 2003 with information from 2001 indicates that a heart attack, diabetes, 
hypertension, tuberculosis, and limitations with daily activities have strong negative effects on participation two years 
later. page 19/29 
4.4 Work and retirement pensions in more detail 
 
Labor force participation and the receipt of a retirement pension are not exclusive states. 
People  can  receive  a  retirement  pension  after  a  career  in  a  formal  job  in  which  they 
contributed to the plans for a sufficiently long period, but decide that the income is not 
sufficient and continue to work in another (formal, or more likely, informal) job. In this 
section  we  analyze  the  joint  labor  force  participation  and  retirement  decision  with  a 
multinomial logit model, distinguishing five states: (1) no work, no retirement benefits; (2) 
no work, only retirement benefits; (3) informal job, no retirement benefits; (4) formal job, 
no retirement benefits; and (5) retirement benefits combined with a formal or informal job. 
The latter state comprises both formal and informal jobs with retirement benefits, because 
the number of people who have a formal job while receiving retirement pension is very low 
(table 13).
13 Table 13 further shows that the large majority of women over 50  are not 
employed and do not receive a retirement pension. Most of these women never worked in a 
paid job and never contributed to a pension plan. Among men we see a more balanced 
distribution; therefore we perform the analysis only for men.  
 
Table 13 Employment and retirement pensions, 2003 
  gender   
employment and retirement  men  women  total 
not employed, no pension  17.92  69.86  47.06 
not employed, with pension  16.84  6.74  11.17 
informal sector, no pension  41.82  18.17  28.55 
informal sector, with pension  6.56  0.83  3.34 
formal sector, no pension  15.44  4.14  9.10 
formal sector, with pension  1.42  0.26  0.77 
total  100  100  100 
number of observations  4,436  5,670  10,106 
Note: The states “informal sector, with pension” and “formal sector, with pension” are taken together in the analysis. 
 
In the multinomial logit model we explain the situation in 2003 using explanatory variables 
measured in 2001, as we did in section 4.3. By doing so we avoid problems with reverse 
causality, because the choice made in 2003 has no effect on the situation in 2001. Table 14 
presents the marginal effects, i.e. changes in probabilities due to a one unit change in the 
continuous explanatory variables or a shift from 0 to 1 in case of the dummy variables, on 
the  probabilities  for  a  man  with  average  characteristics.  The  initial  situation,  the 
work/pension-combination  in  2001,  has  a  large  predictive  value  for  the  status  in  2003: 
stability is high, transitions are less likely. This holds especially for nonworking people 
with a pension; they are improbable to change their labor market status. Those who receive 
a pension while working in an informal job are the most likely to change situation: it is 
probable that two years later they still receive the pension but stopped working. The effects 
of the other characteristics are remarkably insensitive for the inclusion of the initial state.  
Age combined with the number of years with contributions to pension plans, which 
determine the opportunities to obtain a pension, is an important factor in the explanation of 
the observed situation. Elderly over 65 are much more likely to receive a pension, and so do 
those who contributed to a pension plan for 25 years or more – either with or without an 
additional  job.  Also  the  group  aged  between  60  and  65  with  at  least  10  years  of 
                                                 
13 Tests suggest that the two states can be combined, while for all other combinations the hypothesis that the parameters 
are equal is strongly rejected. A Hausman test indicates that the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)-hypothesis 
is not violated and thus a multinomial logit model is appropriate. page 20/29 
contributions has an increased possibility to receive a pension, but with a stronger effect on 
the alternative to work in addition to the pension. Historical contributions to pension plans 
strongly reduce the chance to be working in an informal job without receipt of a pension. 
The  financial  opportunities  thus  appear  of  great  importance  for  the  decisions.  Having 
access to social security (health) services in 2001, either due to one’s own contributions or 
related to contributing relatives, is important for the prediction of the observed labor status 
in 2003. Those with access are more likely to receive a pension, or, to a lesser extent, to 
have a formal job. Access in 2001 strongly reduces the likelihood of being in the informal 
sector without a pension in 2003. 
A  higher  level  of  education  increases  the  probability  that  a  pension  is  received 
without an additional job. Apparently, men with higher education obtained the better-paid 
formal jobs with sufficiently good pension rights. Surprising is that the reasoning regarding 
effects of education does not hold for elderly with preparatory or higher level of education; 
for these levels we find no effect at all. Maybe this is due to the relatively small number of 
people with these levels of education, or their increased access to pensions is captured by 
other determinants.  
 
Table 14 Determinants of participation and pension receipt in 2003 
   -see at the end of the paper - 
 
Simulations of the probabilities of work and pension for the sampled elderly can illustrate 
the results. In figure 4 we show the probabilities that a man with average values on all the 
characteristics in the model of table 14, obtains a pension. Assuming that nothing changes 
in the average characteristics over time, but that the estimated probabilities two years later 
have become reality, allows the construction of a longer-run projection. The figure shows 
an  increase  of  pension  beneficiaries  over  time,  and  an  increase  in  the  number  of  non-
working  elderly  men.  Given  the  assumed  absence  of  changes  in  characteristics,  the 
distribution converges to a stationary state. This illustration is imperfect, the direct use of 
predicted  pensions  overestimates  the  true  probabilities  because  they  need  to  be 
compensated for the inflow of younger elderly who are not retired yet, which however is 
partly  compensated  because  in  reality  the  “average  man”  changes  over  time.  Younger 
generations  generally  have  higher  educational  levels  and  better  jobs,  increasing  the 
likelihood that they participated in a pension plan and may become claimants later. It would 
be interesting but is beyond the scope of this chapter to make precise predictions of the 
number of beneficiaries of a retirement pension. It would require mimicking the changes 
over  time  in  the  population  distribution  for  all  its  characteristics,  a  task  with  a  lot  of 
uncertainties, even if we abstract from changes in public policies and behavioral changes.  
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
It is clear that the size of the younger generations in Mexico is decreasing, which implies that 
in the longer run the elderly population will significantly increase in size. Measures have to be 
taken  now  to  construct  a  sustainable  framework  for  retirement  pensions  and  health  care 
services, in order to avoid running into financial problems when large groups of people want 
to retire or need more care. For the design of a sustainable social security it is relevant to know 
the mechanisms that govern the labor force participation and retirement decisions. We analyze 
the relation between labor force participation, retirement pensions, and health using data from 
the Estudio Nacional sobre Salud y Envejecimiento en México (ENASEM), a panel data set 
that contains detailed information on the health and financial situation of the elderly aged 
50 and over. 
A causal analysis of the effects of health on labor force participation and vice versa 
show an important role of health in participation decisions of men, where a better health 
increases  the  participation  rate.  For  women  this  effect  is  absent.  We  do  not  find  clear 
indications of an effect running in the opposite direction. In the causal analysis neither men 
nor women show an effect running from labor force participation to health, and also in an 
analysis of the changes  in health over a two  year period we do not find clear effects of 
participation in the initial year on the prevalence of diseases or symptoms two years later. 
The financial situation, in particular previous contributions to a pension plan, and the 
right to obtain a pension from the plan, are important driving factors for the male participation 
decision. Older men who have contributed during a longer period are more likely to stop 
working completely than younger men or men with fewer years of contribution. Many women 
indicated they never had a paid job, and apparently participation is not reconsidered at old age 
but simply a continuation of historical decisions: we find that women living together with a 
partner, or with children, are less likely to work. However we find that opportunities to qualify 
for a pension increase the chance of continuation of participation among women.  
A factor that is important in both the male and female participation decision is the 
access  to  health  care  services  provided  by  social  security  institutions.  Both  for  men  and 
women the variable that indicates access to social security services, which can be derived 
from  working  relatives,  has  a  strong  negative  effect  on  the  participation.  Apparently, 
having access due to others (partner, children) strongly reduces the need or desire to have a 
paid job. 
In the final section it is acknowledged that being active in the labor market and the 
receipt of a retirement pension are not exclusive states, but that some people remain working, 
often in an informal job, while receiving a pension. The expected effects of the financial page 22/29 
background  are  found  when  explaining  the  decisions  of  elderly  men.  People  who  made 
contributions to  pension  plans  are  more likely  to  receive  a  pension,  although  it  does  not 
discriminate between receiving it with or without an additional job. Over a period of two years 
there is a high persistence; only the receipt of a pension while working in an informal job 
strongly increases the probability to change status, in particular the probability that two 
years later they stopped working. Access to social security strongly reduces the probability 
that one is employed in the informal sector without a pension two years later.  
The financial situation, in particular the opportunity to obtain a retirement pension after 
earlier contributions, the access to health care services, and the health itself are important 
driving factors behind the decisions about participation in the labor market and the sector 
choice.  Redesign  of  the  social  security  system,  including  health  insurance  and  retirement 
pensions, will have effects on participation decisions, and therefore on future contributions to 
the insurance and pension plans, not only directly but also indirectly as it may change the pros 
and  cons  of  obtaining  formal  instead  of  informal  employment.  Taking  into  account  the 
foreseeable aging that will reduce the number of potential contributors in the long run, each 
proposal for a better system should make sure that enough people contribute to the plans in 
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Appendix A Analytical model and estimation strategy 
 
Causal effects of health and labor force participation are analyzed in a model that derives from 
Stern (1989), extended to a panel data context by Cai (2007). For each individual i participation in page 24/29 
year t, Pit, is described as a function of health status Hit
**, a set of individual characteristics, and a 
random disturbance term: 
      Pit
* = λP Hit
** + βP xP,it + uP,it,  (A1) 
where Pit
* is an unobserved variable representing the propensity that an elderly person participates in 
the labor force in period t, and Pit equals 1 if Pit
*>0, and zero otherwise. The parameter λP measures the 
(causal) effect of health on the participation decision.  
The equation that describes the true but unobservable health Hit
** is given as: 
      Hit
** = αH Pit
* + βH xH,it + uH,it;  (A2) 
true health depends on individual characteristics xH,it and on the propensity to work Pit
*. The parameter 
αH  represents  the  (causal)  effect  of  labor  force  participation  on  the  true  health.  Observed  is  the 
subjective, self-assessed health Hit, while Hit
* is the continuous latent counterpart of Hit, where Hit=k 
(k=0, ..., 3) when mk<Hit
*≤mk+1 (mk are cut-off points to be estimated along with the other parameters; 
m0=-∞ and m4=∞). If non-participants justify themselves by exaggerating their health problems, there 
will be a difference between the true and the self-assessed health,  
      Hit
** = Hit
* - δJ Pit
* - uJ,it,  (A3) 
where the parameter δJ will has a positive value: participating elderly (with a larger value of Pit
*) report 
a better health status (Hit
*) than they have in reality (Hit
**).  
Substitution of (A3) in the participation equation (A1) yields the labor force participation 
equation that forms the basis of the empirical work: 




1 xP,it + vP,it,  (A4) 
where λP
1=λP/(1+λPδJ), βP
1=βP/(1+λPδJ), and vP,it=(uP,it-λPuJ,it)/(1+λPδJ). Substitution of (A3) in the true 
health equation gives the empirical model for Hit
*: 
      Hit
* = αH
1 Pit
* + βH xH,it + vH,it,   (A5) 
where αH
1=αH+δJ and vH,it=uH,it+uJ,it. Both disturbance terms can be decomposed in an individual part 
independent of time and a time-varying part, vm,it=εm,i+ηm,it (m=P, H).  
Equations (A4) and (A5) link labor force participation and self-assessed health to each other. 
Only the sum of the two sources of endogeneity, αH
1, is identifiable, but whether the endogeneity 
occurs because participation directly affects the true health status (αH) or is due to justification of the 
labor status (δJ) is not identifiable. However the sign of αH
1 can give information about which type of 
endogeneity dominates. 
 
The joint estimation of the simultaneous equations model formed by the labor force participation 
(A4) and health status (A5) is not straightforward, due to the qualitative nature of the dependent 
variables. Assuming that the disturbances are normally distributed, equation (A5) is essentially a panel 
ordered probit model, while equation (A4) is a panel probit model. Panel models of this type have not 
been estimated frequently. An exception is Cai (2007), who estimates both a two-stage version of 
the model as well as a full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) method. Two-stage estimation 
is consistent but the correlation between the disturbance terms vP,it and vH,it cannot be estimated and 
is  therefore  assumed  to  equal  zero.  FIML  allows  estimation  of  the  correlation  between  the 
disturbance terms; however it requires evaluation of a multidimensional integral of a multivariate 
normal distribution function.
14 Therefore we opt for the two-stage method.  
In the first stage, reduced forms of both equations are estimated. A panel probit model is used 
to estimate a reduced form model of participation including all variables in xP,it and xH,it,  
                                                 
14  Estimations  of  the  cross-sectional  model  occur  more  frequently,  usually  applying  the  two-stage  method  (see  Van 
Gameren, 2008). Maximum simulated likelihood applications are found in Cai and Kalb (2006) for cross-section data and 
in Cai (2007) with panel data. Cai and Kalb (2006) find an insignificant correlation for men and a significant negative 
value for women. The latter implies a bias towards zero in the effect of health on participation if the model does not 
account for correlation (Stern, 1989; Cai and Kalb, 2006). We have more information on work history and objective 
health than Cai and Kalb (2006), which reduces the probability that omitted factors affect both labor force participation 
and health, and thus raises the chance that the assumption of no correlation is valid. Checks with recursive bivariate 
ordered probit models (Sajaia, 2007) suggest that the correlation is indeed small both in 2001 and in 2003. page 25/29 
      Pit
* = (βP
1 xP,it + λP
1βH xH,it) / (1-αH
1λP
1) + vP,it
* = ζP xit + vP,it
*,  (A6) 
where xit contains all the exogenous variables in xP,it and xH,it. The disturbance term can be decomposed 
in  a  time-constant  and  a  time  varying  part,  vP,it











1). Similarly a reduced-form health equation is estimated using a panel 
ordered probit model,
15 
      Hit
* = (αH
1βP
1 xP,it + βH xH,it) / (1-αH
1λP
1) + vH,it
* = ζH xit + vH,it
*,  (A7) 
where  vH,it










1).  The 
results from these estimations are used to calculate the propensity to participate in the labor market  it P ˆ  
and the ‘health stock’ Ĥit of each individual i in each time period t: 
      it P ˆ  =  P z ˆ  xit,  (A8) 
      Ĥit =  H z ˆ  xit.  (A9) 
In the second stage the structural model defined by equations (A4) and (A5) is estimated, 
where the predictions Ĥit and  it P ˆ  replace the potentially endogenous explanatory variables Hit
* and Pit
*: 
      Pit
* = λP
1 Ĥit + βP
1 xP,it + vP,it,  (A10) 
      Hit
* = αH
1  it P ˆ  + βH xH,it + vH,it.   (A11) 
For equation (A10) a panel probit model with Pit as dependent variable can be used. Equation (A11) 
with Hit as the dependent variable can be estimated by panel ordered probit model. Both models include 
the individual-specific part of the error terms as random effects.  
 
                                                 
15 A probit panel data model is available in Stata v9.2: xtprobit. An ordered probit panel data model can be estimated with 
the unofficial Stata command reoprob (Frechette, 2001). page 26/29 
Appendix B Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables 
 
Table B Descriptive statistics of the variables in the models, 2001 
  men  women 
  mean  std.dev.  mean  std.dev. 
age   62.128  9.150  61.485  8.967 
#children (live births)   5.884  3.608  6.063  3.639 
couple   0.836  0.369  0.584  0.492 
educ.: primary   0.551  0.497  0.538  0.498 
educ.: secondary   0.076  0.265  0.052  0.222 
educ.: technical/commercial   0.029  0.168  0.082  0.274 
educ.: preparatory or higher   0.129  0.335  0.060  0.239 
able to read and write   0.853  0.354  0.775  0.417 
able to count from 1 to 10   0.945  0.227  0.918  0.274 
speaks English   0.111  0.315  0.059  0.236 
speaks indigenous language   0.081  0.274  0.061  0.240 
locality size: 15000-100000   0.152  0.359  0.153  0.360 
locality size: 2500-15000   0.091  0.288  0.088  0.284 
locality size: <2500   0.183  0.387  0.150  0.357 
non-business assets   0.333  0.666  0.300  0.515 
has access to social security   0.613  0.487  0.642  0.479 
contributed, age <60, <=10 yrs   0.053  0.225  0.031  0.175 
contributed, age <60, 10<=25 yrs   0.097  0.296  0.030  0.172 
contributed, age <60, >25 yrs   0.077  0.267  0.025  0.157 
contributed, age 60-65, <=10 yrs   0.014  0.120  0.005  0.076 
contributed, age 60-65,10<=25 yrs   0.023  0.151  0.007  0.087 
contributed, age 60-65, >25 yrs   0.039  0.194  0.010  0.101 
contributed, age >=65, <=10 yrs   0.033  0.180  0.007  0.086 
contributed, age >=65, 10<=25 yrs   0.043  0.203  0.007  0.084 
contributed, age >=65, >25 yrs   0.081  0.273  0.011  0.105 
occ.: production, repair, maintenance  0.387  0.487  0.125  0.330 
occ.: agriculture   0.276  0.447  0.064  0.246 
occ.: professional, technical, education  0.088  0.284  0.067  0.251 
occ.: management position   0.021  0.146  0.007  0.084 
occ.: administrative activities   0.054  0.226  0.062  0.241 
occ.: merchants, sales representative  0.081  0.273  0.120  0.325 
occ.: service industry, domestic work  0.080  0.271  0.231  0.421 
occ.: other   0.007  0.084  0.001  0.032 
contr.: salary   0.579  0.494  0.399  0.490 
contr.: boss   0.043  0.204  0.014  0.120 
contr.: self-employed   0.289  0.453  0.165  0.372 
contr.: commission, other payment   0.073  0.260  0.046  0.211 
contr.: without payment   0.005  0.071  0.046  0.210 
Note: The objective health measures, included only in the health equation, are listed in table 6.  
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Table 12 Effect of participation in 2001 on health in 2003 
  MEN    WOMEN 
  employment  (s.e.)  lagged health  (s.e.)  job char.
 b    employment  (s.e.)  lagged health  (s.e.)  job char.
 b 
hypertension/high blood pressure  -0.002  (0,055)  1.350***  (0,048)  23.390    -0.118**  (0,052)  1.330***  (0,039)  17.350 
diabetes/high blood sugar level  -0.073  (0,077)  2.641***  (0,079)  35.780**    -0.152**  (0,076)  2.578***  (0,062)  25.390 
cancer/malignant tumor    -0.098  (0,187)  1.483***  (0,335)  24.040    -0.481*  (0,263)  1.924***  (0,205)  26.650** 
respiratory illness (asthma)  -0.040  (0,091)  1.297***  (0,104)  17.880    0.019  (0,093)  1.266***  (0,087)  14.220 
heart attack              -0.013  (0,111)  0.948***  (0,147)  22.020    -0.094  (0,137)  1.405***  (0,138)  33.410*** 
stroke                    0.010  (0,178)  1.578***  (0,217)  17.520    0.210  (0,167)  1.125***  (0,187)  31.820*** 
arthritis/rheumatism      0.094  (0,063)  0.849***  (0,062)  27.930    -0.063  (0,057)  1.109***  (0,044)  25.090 
liver/kidney infection    -0.034  (0,075)  0.749***  (0,085)  26.200    -0.062  (0,070)  0.950***  (0,063)  29.910 
pneumonia                 0.026  (0,159)  1.098***  (0,285)  17.140    -0.304**  (0,154)  0.758***  (0,195)  30.770*** 
fallen down               0.016  (0,051)  0.529***  (0,046)  27.780    0.100**  (0,048)  0.650***  (0,036)  19.260 
mental health problems 
a   -0.067  (0,062)  0.075***  (0,013)  30.110    -0.050  (0,068)  0.087***  (0,011)  20.540 
problems with (i)adl 
a  -0.045  (0,053)  0.071***  (0,009)  25.710    -0.158***  (0,056)  0.051***  (0,008)  40.890** 
                                   
missing limb, leg or arm  0.073  (0,175)  2.402***  (0,191)  43.260***    -0.764**  (0,356)  2.321***  (0,345)  10.050 
swollen feet/ankles       0.005  (0,058)  0.707***  (0,058)  12.680    -0.052  (0,052)  0.786***  (0,041)  14.340 
difficulty breathing      0.007  (0,064)  0.697***  (0,071)  31.350    -0.156**  (0,063)  0.730***  (0,058)  19.620 
fainting spells, vertigo   -0.013  (0,057)  0.585***  (0,061)  35.990**    -0.113**  (0,052)  0.663***  (0,044)  21.250 
intense thirst            -0.099  (0,060)  0.438***  (0,064)  33.370*    0.023  (0,059)  0.672***  (0,052)  39.190** 
severe fatigue/exhaustion    -0.014  (0,055)  0.225***  (0,058)  42.490***    -0.047  (0,053)  0.254***  (0,046)  32.780* 
wheezing/cough/phlegm     0.019  (0,057)  0.375***  (0,059)  32.220*    -0.068  (0,056)  0.490***  (0,051)  25.940 
pain in lower limbs       -0.008  (0,051)  0.336***  (0,048)  57.060***    0.011  (0,049)  0.404***  (0,041)  25.410 
stomach pain, indigestion   -0.055  (0,057)  0.385***  (0,059)  26.910    -0.038  (0,053)  0.483***  (0,046)  13.400 
pain when urinating       -0.087  (0,068)  0.740***  (0,095)  20.130    -0.048  (0,071)  0.608***  (0,078)  20.340 
                                   
overweight: 25<=bmi<30    0.150**  (0,052)  0.866***  (0,051)  40.580**    -0.084  (0,053)  0.732***  (0,055)  49.640*** 
overweight: 30<=bmi       -0.062  (0,066)  1.997***  (0,086)  29.350    0.070  (0,061)  1.764***  (0,080)  35.520** 
smoke cigarettes now      0.015  (0,066)  2.121***  (0,055)  19.220    -0.008  (0,091)  2.488***  (0,076)  20.870 
drink alcohol now         0.092*  (0,052)  1.071***  (0,043)  24.150    0.017  (0,059)  0.943***  (0,050)  32.090* 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: Probit regressions, in which we also control for the variables used in table 11.  
a Also for mental health and (i)adl-problems a probit regression is run, where 0 stands for ‘no problem’ and 1 for ‘one or more problems’ 
b Likelihood ratio (χ
2) test of the joint significance of the job characteristics (variables used as instruments for employment in the health equations in table 11). 
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Table 14 Determinants of participation and pension receipt in 2003 
  no work, no pension  no work, with pension  informal job, no pension  working, with pension  formal job, no pension 
2001: not employed, no pension  0.268***  (0.026)  0.166  ***  (0.026)  -0.355***  (0.022)  -0.025***  (0.009)  -0.054  ***  (0.012) 
2001: not employed, pension     -0.006  (0.040)  0.563  ***  (0.047)  -0.472***  (0.029)  0.002  (0.012)  -0.086  ***  (0.011) 
2001: informal sect., pension   -0.198***  (0.033)  0.440  ***  (0.063)  -0.391***  (0.047)  0.226***  (0.050)  -0.077  ***  (0.013) 
2001: formal sector, no pension  -0.020  (0.033)  0.050  **  (0.020)  -0.297***  (0.031)  -0.018*  (0.010)  0.285  ***  (0.038) 
2001: formal sector, pension    -0.191***  (0.064)  0.142  **  (0.071)  -0.198*  (0.113)  0.150**  (0.061)  0.098    (0.070) 
age                             -0.002  (0.013)  0.012    (0.007)  -0.057***  (0.017)  0.053***  (0.009)  -0.006    (0.011) 
age squared                     0.012  (0.010)  -0.005    (0.005)  0.033**  (0.013)  -0.040***  (0.007)  0.000    (0.009) 
#children (live births)         0.005*  (0.003)  0.001    (0.001)  -0.002  (0.003)  0.000  (0.001)  -0.003  *  (0.002) 
couple                          -0.036  (0.025)  0.030  ***  (0.010)  -0.015  (0.029)  0.009  (0.010)  0.012    (0.013) 
educ.: primary                  -0.019  (0.026)  0.030  **  (0.014)  -0.027  (0.033)  0.008  (0.014)  0.008    (0.017) 
educ.: secondary                -0.043  (0.041)  0.073  **  (0.035)  -0.057  (0.054)  0.001  (0.020)  0.026    (0.027) 
educ.: technical/commercial     -0.014  (0.063)  0.120  **  (0.057)  -0.127  (0.077)  0.019  (0.032)  0.002    (0.029) 
educ.: preparatory or higher    -0.049  (0.045)  0.041    (0.030)  -0.006  (0.058)  0.013  (0.023)  0.001    (0.023) 
able to read and write          -0.001  (0.032)  0.000    (0.019)  -0.004  (0.041)  0.016  (0.016)  -0.012    (0.024) 
able to count from 1 to 10      0.001  (0.040)  0.001    (0.023)  -0.009  (0.051)  -0.012  (0.027)  0.020    (0.023) 
speaks English                  0.005  (0.032)  -0.004    (0.013)  0.009  (0.038)  0.021  (0.015)  -0.032  ***  (0.011) 
speaks indigenous language      0.025  (0.033)  -0.023    (0.014)  -0.027  (0.039)  0.021  (0.019)  0.004    (0.019) 
locality size: 15000-100000     -0.031  (0.024)  0.000    (0.012)  0.039  (0.030)  -0.004  (0.011)  -0.004    (0.012) 
locality size: 2500-15000       -0.058**  (0.028)  -0.013    (0.016)  0.058  (0.038)  0.000  (0.016)  0.013    (0.021) 
locality size: <2500            -0.052**  (0.026)  -0.046  ***  (0.012)  0.141***  (0.033)  -0.023*  (0.013)  -0.021    (0.016) 
non-business assets             -0.002  (0.018)  -0.002    (0.009)  -0.001  (0.018)  0.005  (0.005)  0.000    (0.007) 
health                          -0.057***  (0.011)  -0.011  **  (0.005)  0.051***  (0.013)  0.013***  (0.005)  0.004    (0.005) 
has access to social security   -0.021  (0.021)  0.127  ***  (0.013)  -0.212***  (0.024)  0.081***  (0.011)  0.025  *  (0.013) 
contributed, age <60, <=10 yrs   0.043  (0.049)  0.080  *  (0.042)  -0.173***  (0.046)  0.020  (0.031)  0.030    (0.021) 
contributed, age <60, 10<=25 yrs   -0.014  (0.039)  0.087  **  (0.034)  -0.225***  (0.038)  0.103***  (0.037)  0.048  **  (0.020) 
contributed, age <60, >25 yrs   -0.056  (0.041)  0.151  ***  (0.041)  -0.262***  (0.042)  0.138***  (0.042)  0.029    (0.019) 
contributed, age 60-65, <=10 yrs   -0.041  (0.063)  0.060    (0.049)  -0.229***  (0.071)  0.087*  (0.051)  0.124  *  (0.064) 
contributed, age 60-65,10<=25 yrs   -0.073  (0.051)  0.195  ***  (0.056)  -0.397***  (0.047)  0.280***  (0.064)  -0.006    (0.027) 
contributed, age 60-65, >25 yrs   -0.077*  (0.046)  0.215  ***  (0.049)  -0.385***  (0.048)  0.237***  (0.054)  0.011    (0.027) 
contributed, age >=65, <=10 yrs   -0.119***  (0.032)  0.175  ***  (0.048)  -0.252***  (0.057)  0.095**  (0.043)  0.101  *  (0.060) 
contributed, age >=65, 10<=25 yrs   -0.122***  (0.032)  0.200  ***  (0.047)  -0.290***  (0.054)  0.102***  (0.039)  0.109  *  (0.056) 
contributed, age >=65, >25 yrs   -0.061*  (0.036)  0.145  ***  (0.035)  -0.339***  (0.051)  0.213**  (0.047)  0.042    (0.042) 
occ.: production, repair, maintenance  -0.058  (0.075)  0.045    (0.048)  0.078  (0.100)  -0.028  (0.034)  -0.038    (0.043) 
occ.: agriculture   -0.090  (0.069)  0.059    (0.058)  0.083  (0.102)  -0.015  (0.035)  -0.037    (0.040) 
occ.: professional, technical, education  -0.035  (0.080)  0.064    (0.072)  -0.039  (0.112)  -0.015  (0.031)  0.025    (0.059) 
occ.: management position   -0.106  (0.074)  0.054    (0.080)  0.062  (0.126)  -0.029  (0.024)  0.019    (0.064) 
occ.: administrative activities   -0.036  (0.083)  0.089    (0.085)  -0.007  (0.121)  -0.029  (0.024)  -0.017    (0.041) 
occ.: merchants, sales representative  -0.123**  (0.057)  0.028    (0.059)  0.140  (0.100)  -0.012  (0.034)  -0.033    (0.034) 
occ.: service industry, domestic work  -0.085  (0.065)  0.067    (0.073)  0.029  (0.109)  -0.016  (0.031)  0.005    (0.050) 
contr.: boss                    0.042  (0.048)  -0.042  ***  (0.015)  0.005  (0.051)  -0.006  (0.019)  0.001    (0.023) 
contr.: self-employed           0.005  (0.022)  -0.049  ***  (0.011)  0.101***  (0.026)  -0.011  (0.011)  -0.046  ***  (0.012) 
contr.: commission, other payment   0.062*  (0.036)  0.003    (0.016)  -0.019  (0.040)  -0.022*  (0.012)  -0.026  *  (0.014) 
contr.: other/unknown           -0.097  (0.064)  0.095    (0.076)  0.073  (0.103)  -0.027  (0.028)  -0.044    (0.028) page 29/29 
#observations                     4436                         
Chi2 Test  5388.8                         
p-value Chi2                       0.000                         
LogLikelihood   -3795.0                         
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: Marginal effects after multinomial logit estimation, calculated at the means of the variables.  